“CURING” PYRRHONIAN DOUBT: ANTI-SKEPTICAL RHETORIC IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY by Anton MATYTSIN
“CURING” PYRRHONIAN DOUBT: ANTI-SKEPTICAL 
RHETORIC IN THE EARLY 18
TH CENTURY 
 
Anton MATYTSIN* 
 
 
Abstract. By examining the analogies of sickness and disease used by several 
opponents of philosophical skepticism (Pyrrhonism) in the early 18th century, this article 
will shed light on the rhetorical strategies used in attempts to undermine the revival of 
this ancient school of philosophy. It will look at the ways in which anti-skeptics discussed 
the  repercussions  of  the  spread  of  Pyrrhonism  for  society  and  describe  how  they 
proposed to “cure” this so-called disease. A consideration of the strategies will both 
reveal some of the assumptions commonly shared by authors of apologetic literature in 
the first half of the 18th century and explain why they saw skepticism as such a dangerous 
philosophical position.  
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Introduction 
The essential tenet of Pyrrhonian skepticism, that the mind cannot know anything with 
certainty, including the veracity of the very proposition that the mind cannot know anything with 
certainty, had always been an extremely difficult position to refute philosophically. By making 
their own conclusion inconclusive, the skeptics left their opponents with little to disprove. The 
burden on disproof lay with the dogmatic philosophers, while the skeptics needed merely to 
demonstrate the weaknesses of the various axioms and premises. Fundamentally, the skeptics 
denied the possibility of obtaining true and certain knowledge about the surrounding world and 
about the content of the human understanding based on the view that the mind and the senses 
were  unsuitable  and  insufficient  tools  for  acquiring  such  knowledge.  They  enumerated  the 
weaknesses of the sensory apparatus and the flaws in the operations of the mind to support their 
conclusions, and they gave numerous examples of how those weaknesses led to erroneous and 
uncertain ideas. They saw the feebleness of the understanding as a permanent state of affairs.  
After the rediscovery of the works of Sextus Empiricus, whose Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
offered an exposition of Pyrrho’s philosophy, in the 16th century, Pyrrhonian skepticism gradually 
gained popularity among early-modern philosophers.1 By the late-17th and early-18th centuries, it 
had  attracted  a  number  of  prominent  followers,  especially  in  the  Francophone  world  where 
prominent  thinkers  such  as  Michel  de  Montaigne,  Pierre  Charron,  Blaise  Pascal,  and  Simon 
Foucher,  among  others,  popularized  skeptical  arguments  and  applied  them  to  a  variety  of 
disciplines. In attempting to disseminate Pyrrhonism, early-modern thinkers adopted a variety of 
formulations and rhetorical strategies. For example, in denying the possibility of knowing the 
essences of things, one of the most notable skeptics of the early 18th century, bishop Pierre-
Daniel Huet, maintained that one could never accurately know whether the objects perceived by 
the senses matched the real nature of the objects, since one only had access to the reproduction 
and not to the original.2 While Huet made a rather ordered case for philosophical skepticism, his 
famous contemporary Pierre Bayle offered a significantly less systematic exposition of the ancient 
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philosophy.  In  his  Dictionnaire  historique  et  critique  (1697),  Bayle  presented  his  readers  with  a 
plethora of paradoxes, dilemmas, and unanswerable riddles. The goal of all these passages was 
not to provide an explicit exposition of the skeptical philosophy, but to implicitly demonstrate, 
through numerous examples, that, given the feebleness of the human mind, the suspension of 
judgment on philosophical questions was the only possible option. Bayle’s arguments were even 
more difficult to answer than Huet’s, because they were scattered throughout the multivolume 
work. 
Despite the difficulty of answering Pyrrhonian arguments, the apparent proliferation of 
philosophical  skepticism  in  the  late-17th  and  early-18th  centuries  was  met  with  a  number  of 
refutations and condemnations. In order to explain the seeming intransigence and the paradoxical 
philosophical positions of their opponents, the anti-skeptics often claimed that their adversaries 
were providing insincere arguments that aimed only to oppose particular positions and ideas 
rather than to provide coherent philosophical views. While the skeptics claimed that the human 
mind was permanently afflicted and weakened, their opponents suggested that, on the contrary, 
solely the minds of the Pyrrhonists were plagued and possessed. They attributed the skeptics’ 
insincerity to a moral and intellectual disease, one that was corrupting the hearts and minds of 
students and intellectuals of their age, and one that had dangerous implications not only for 
philosophy  and  scholarship,  but  also  for  the  state  of  society  in  general.  The  anti-skeptics 
frequently portrayed Pyrrhonism as a mental disorder or a contagion that plagued minds and 
spread quickly from person to person, creating a culture of incredulity, sensuality, and moral 
chaos.  Indeed,  the  anti-skeptical  literature  was  filled  with  alarmist  warnings  and  apocalyptic 
predictions about the dangers of the Pyrrhonist plague that was engulfing the enlightened world 
of the 18th century. These authors saw a steady growth in the number of skeptics, unbelievers, 
and  libertines,  and  they  believed  that  these  “irreverent”  doctrines  mutually  reinforced  one 
another. 
By  examining  the  analogies  of  sickness  and  disease  used  by  several  opponents  of 
skepticism, this article will shed light on the rhetorical strategies used in attempts to defeat the 
skeptics. It will also look at the ways in which anti-skeptics proposed to “cure” this so-called 
disease. A consideration of the strategies will both reveal some of the assumptions commonly 
shared by authors of apologetic literature in the first half of the 18th century and explain why they 
saw skepticism as such a dangerous philosophical position.  
 
Diagnosing the Disease 
  Opponents of skepticism often likened this ancient philosophy to a disease that was 
quickly spreading across their contemporaneous societies by corrupting the minds of the reading 
public. An anonymous letter in the Bibliothèque Germanique from 1730 described the pernicious 
effects of Pyrrhonism and claimed that “Its evils do not just affect a small number of people; it is 
a contagion that spreads itself and leads a universal ravage.”3 The author of the article claimed 
that skepticism spread quickly from one infected person to another and that Bayle’s Dictionnaire 
was the most obvious source of the contagion. The work, according to the article, was filled with 
frivolous material that would keep debates on various topics raging on and prevent any certainty. 
  The effects of Bayle’s dictionary varied according to the age and the “humeur” of the 
reader, just as a disease would affect different bodies in different ways.4 Those most in danger of 
succumbing to skepticism, the anonymous author argued, were readers who were inexperienced 
in  the  philosophical  and  scholarly  debates  that  Bayle  discussed.  Having  read  the  various 
superficial  musings  of  the  Dictionnaire,  such  a  semi-educated  reader  would  feel  as  if  he  had 
become an expert in every subject from logic to medicine. The faux-intellectual would then parrot  
 
 
Anton Matytsin - “Curing” Pyrrhonian Doubt: Anti-Skeptical Rhetoric in the Early 18
th Century 
  68 
Bayle’s attacks on various respected philosophers without fully understanding the significance and 
meaning of the debates: 
 
It does not matter, he prides himself on being in the position to take on the whole world; 
he recites from memory the great passages of his author; he does not understand even a 
half of them; he frequently mangles them, but his confidence is not at all shaken. His 
authority and aplomb impose themselves on another ignorant one, who, in turn, affirms 
the one who mislead him in the errors and in the fantasy that he is a clever man. The 
contagion spreads in this way; one does not see oneself to be mistaken, because one sees 
many people equally mistaken; and, after having been misled by another, one, in turn, 
misleads a third person.5 
 
The anonymous author was particularly upset with the effects of the Dictionnaire, because 
he saw it as a text that not only easily misled inexperienced readers down the road to Pyrrhonism, 
but also turned them into sources of the contagion. This gave Bayle’s work, according to the 
author, the ability to spread the disease of skepticism by geometric leaps. 
The arch-critic of Bayle in the 18th century, Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, who taught logic and 
mathematics at the University of Lausanne, made similar comparisons between skepticism and 
infection  in  his  Examen  du  pyrrhonisme  ancien  et  moderne  (1733).6  He  saw  Pyrrhonism  not  as  a 
coherent and consistent philosophical system, but as a “derangement of the mind and of the 
heart.”7 Crousaz repeatedly described skepticism as a “disease that troubles the mind, that blinds 
it, and that casts it into obstinacy.”8 The philosophical skeptics, in his view, had an insatiable 
appetite for argument and sought to contradict all philosophical propositions, without regard for 
the established certainty of such propositions or for the evidence that might support them. He 
argued that the skeptics were unnaturally obsessed with, but also very gifted at, finding faults in 
the most respected doctrines, going even so far as doubting their own existence.9  
Crousaz suggested that the origin of the skeptics’ “derangement” came from “the spirit 
of dispute that reigned among the Greeks [and that] contributed significantly to the establishment 
of  Pyrrhonism.”10  He  placed  particular  blame  on  the  oft-maligned  sophists,  who  believed 
themselves to be experts in every possible discipline and who emphasized rhetorical skill over 
scholarly  proficiency.  The  sophists,  according  to  Crousaz,  continually  sought  new  rhetorical 
tactics  for  disproving  their  opponents  and  became  accustomed  to  a  taste  for  constant 
contradiction. They did not care about the content of a given argument, but only about the ability 
to  disprove  it.  Painting  a  historical  picture  of  an  intellectual  culture  engaged  in  endless  and 
seemingly  pointless  disputations,  Crousaz  compared  the  Ancient  Greek  debates  to  the  more 
contemporaneous scholastic philosophical disputations. He maintained that while the particular 
subject matter of the debates did not lead to Pyrrhonism, the preference for the art of rhetoric 
over  the  meticulous  understanding  of  various  subjects  bred  a  spirit  of  contradiction  and 
prevented an orderly examination of the facts. Crousaz accused the contemporary educational 
system for teaching young students to argue before instructing them in the significance and the 
content of the arguments: 
 
One turned philosophy, and then theology, into a skill of speaking much and of thinking 
little, of never understanding the views of others, of taking their thoughts as backward, 
and of not understanding oneself.11 
 
Just as the anonymous author of the letter to the Bibliothèque Germanique, Crousaz believed 
that young and inexperienced minds were most susceptible to the disease of Pyrrhonism.  
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  Aside from impugning the philosophical and religious disputes that plagued his own time 
and censuring what he perceived as an ineffective and dangerous educational system, Crousaz 
offered some universal psychological explanations of why some scholars fell under the spell of 
Pyrrhonian  doubt.  He  described  several  hypothetical  situations  in  which  thinkers  became 
discouraged with a search for truth because of inattention or impatience. Accepting axioms and 
premises without sufficient analysis, Crousaz argued, authors were quick to formulate conclusions 
and to construct entire metaphysical systems. However, once their critics revealed some defects 
or mistakes, the impatient author quickly decided that the fault is not with him, but with the 
human mind. 
 
A man who made mistakes on several occasions is discouraged, and in order to avoid 
having to foreswear his findings, he limits himself to finding probabilities. Then the 
ridicule of those who are stubborn in their own errors affirms him ever more in the party 
of doubt. This is how Pyrrhonism established itself in those times and continues to 
establish itself today.12  
 
For Crousaz, the conversion to philosophical skepticism allowed scholars to justify their 
errors and offered consolation to thinkers who became disillusioned with their own intellectual 
abilities. By claiming that “the human mind uselessly tires itself in the search of truth, and that no 
one will ever find it, since they themselves have not discovered it,” they could conclude that they 
fault lay not with their own shortcomings but with the universal fallibility of human reason.13 
  Crousaz’s Swiss compatriot and notable naturalist Albrecht von Haller, who composed 
the  introductory  remarks  to  the  abrégé  of  Crousaz’s  work  (Jean  Henri  Samuel  Formey’s  Le 
Triomphe  de  l’évidence,  1756),  equated  philosophical  skepticism  with  religious  incredulity.  He 
attributed both to the moral corruption and the increasing superficiality and sensuality of his age:  
 
These faults and these vices are so favorable to unbelief; unbelief, in turn, is favorable to 
them, and the contagion of this evil is so palpable, that the insensitivity to it resembles 
the symptoms of a mortal gangrene.14 
 
Haller saw the sickness and corruption of individuals take on the entire contemporary 
society.  Unbelief  and  skepticism  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  immoral  pursuit  of  sensual 
pleasures, one reinforcing the other. 
  All three authors were surprised to see the spirit of skepticism and irreligion in what they 
perceived  to  be  an  enlightened  age.  The  situation  certainly  appeared  ironic:  the  number  of 
skeptics  continued  to  increase  at  a  time  of  the  greatest  advances  in  philosophy  and  in  the 
sciences.15  Crousaz  attempted  to  explain  the  apparently  growing  popularity  of  philosophical 
skepticism not in the content of existing ideas, but in the form that philosophical and scientific 
debates assumed. Haller, in turn, attributed it to the moral corruption of society, perceiving a 
mutual  reinforcement  between  unbelief  and  skepticism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  egotistic  and 
sensualist materialism, on the other. 
 
Dangerous Symptoms 
  In  addition  to  describing  Pyrrhonism  as  a  disease  and  an  infection,  opponents  of 
skepticism  pointed  to  the  dangerous  symptoms  that  this  disease  manifested  in  society.  The 
arguments about the potential social dangers of Pyrrhonism came, at least in part, from the desire 
to refute Pierre Bayle’s notorious hypothetical insinuation that a society of atheists could be just 
as virtuous as a society of believers.16 By presenting the perils that would be brought about by the  
 
 
Anton Matytsin - “Curing” Pyrrhonian Doubt: Anti-Skeptical Rhetoric in the Early 18
th Century 
  70 
proliferation of skepticism (and, by implication, of atheism and libertinism) anti-skeptics sought 
both  to  refute  Bayle’s  claim  and  to  expose  what  they  saw  as  the  moral  implications  of 
Pyrrhonism. 
Haller,  who  focused  on  describing  the  effects  of  religious  unbelief  rather  than  on 
disproving  skepticism,  painted  a  particularly  dystopian  picture  of  a  culture  that  embraced 
“unbelief”  or  “incredulity”  as  its  dominant  religion.  He  described  a  society  in  which  all  the 
members lived solely for their own pleasure and felt no obligations toward other individuals or 
toward the community. The consequences of such an attitude would be, in Haller’s mind, tragic. 
The family unit would fail to function due to a collapse of marriages, a reduction in childbirth, a 
proliferation of incest and of child abuse, and a rise in the abandonment of children. Trade and 
commerce would collapse because contracts would not be honored and no trust would exist 
among merchants. Charity and friendship would disappear entirely, as each individual would only 
pursue his or her own material interests. Sovereigns would wage endless bloody wars out of 
vanity  and  greed.17  Haller,  explicitly  compared  his  hypothetical  society  to  Hobbes’s  state  of 
nature: 
 
I believe that it is sufficiently demonstrated that this new wisdom is the ruin of [all] social 
life. It gives each man no other object than his own well-being, a purely sensual well-
being. It puts the forces of all men in perpetual opposition, which must result in a state 
of war and universal enmity, a consequence sincerely recognized by Hobbes, and which 
cannot finish until religion comes to bring peace.18 
 
By  equating  religious  skepticism  with  extreme  egotism,  Haller  was  able  to  offer  a 
dramatic dystopian vision of a society diseased with decadence. 
  The anonymous author of the letter to the editors of the Bibliothèque Germanique drew 
similar links among sensualist inclination, skepticism, and atheism even earlier than Haller. He 
suggested that all human motivation depended either on the inborn instinct to satisfy the senses, a 
drive that led human beings toward an insatiable quest for pleasure, or on God-given reason that 
restrained instinctual desires and guided men to virtue. Consequently, the Pyrrhonist claims about 
the irreparable weakness of reason and their call to avoid all rational analyses appeared to the 
author as an underhanded and malicious attempt to promote libertinism. By overemphasizing the 
corrupted nature of the human mind, the author argued that Bayle and other skeptics pushed 
their readers away from an excessive confidence in human reason toward the opposite extreme, 
which promoted unbelief, religious irreverence, and, consequently, immorality and libertinism.19 
  Crousaz  saw  the  proliferation  of  Pyrrhonism  as  an  equivalent  to  a  fire  that  was 
devastating the intellectual and moral landscape of his culture. He argued that Bayle’s intentions 
were irrelevant, given the devastating effects of his Dictionnaire: 
 
Whether he [Bayle] foresaw these effects or whether they are the due to the abuse that 
one made of what he had composed with completely different intentions, this is not the 
most important and the most pressing question that the Examen [du pyrrhonisme ancien et 
moderne] addresses on this subject. When the fire engulfs several houses and is in danger 
of spreading across the whole city, one must rush to put it out, instead of amusing 
oneself by disputing if it was caused by the imprudence or by the malice of its authors.20 
 
As he did in his use of the contagion metaphor, Crousaz stressed the impending perils of 
Pyrrhonism that was engulfing the surrounding intellectual world. The dangers of succumbing to 
universal doubt were threefold, in Crousaz’s view: religious, moral, and intellectual. The threats to  
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the foundations of Christianity received the greatest attention in the Examen. Crousaz sought to 
refute  the  seemingly  pious  propositions  of  outspoken  fideistic  skeptics,  who  called  for  the 
submission of reason to faith. Such arguments, in his view, overlooked the rational foundations 
of religious belief and took for granted ideas that natural reason had provided. Thus, Crousaz 
argued  that  a  rational  understanding  of  God  had  to  precede  any  supernatural  belief  in  His 
existence and in His goodness: 
 
Those who labor for the establishment of Pyrrhonism needlessly try to cover up their 
malicious plan by saying that they have no other goal but to humble reason…In order to 
make the most of faith, and to conduct oneself according to what the word of God 
commands us to believe and to do, one must first of all be assured that this book, on 
which we rely, [that] this book, which is the object of our faith and the foundation of our 
certainty,  is  most  certainly  the  book  that  teaches  us  the  will  of  God.  For  this  it  is 
necessary to already have already have an idea of God, in order to be able to assure 
oneself that this book is from Him by comparing what we learn there with the idea [we 
have] of Him.21 
 
In other words, there could be no religious belief without a prior knowledge of the 
existence of God. This knowledge, for Crousaz, first came into the mind not from Scripture, but 
from a metaphysical analysis of causes and effects. Thus, he argued, the human mind was capable 
of arriving at the knowledge of the existence of God by understanding the necessity of the first 
cause.  Belief  in  the  veracity  of  the  Christian  Revelation  thus  depended,  in  his  view,  on  a 
comparison between the contents of Scripture and the idea of God derived from a rational 
analysis.  Pure  fideism,  Crousaz  insinuated,  was  an  untenable  philosophical  and  theological 
position: either supernatural belief assumed certain rational propositions to be true, in which case 
it was not entirely irrational, or such belief was entirely unfounded. 
  While  the  former  outcome  would  merely  undermine  the  coherence  of  the  fideists’ 
arguments, the latter option would be disastrous for the foundations of Christianity. Indeed, 
Crousaz asked, if natural reason was insufficient in proving the truth of the Revelation, then how 
could  one  distinguish  between  true  faith  and  mere  fanaticism?22  Without  reason,  how  could 
anyone either prove the sanctity and the truth of the Bible or interpret its words?23 Crousaz also 
questioned the certainty which fideists like Huet attached to supernatural faith by invoking the 
contrast to other revealed religions: 
 
Both the Jew and the Muslim brag and boast about the grace of Divine Revelation that 
makes them convinced of the truth of their religion. By what right will a Pyrrhonian 
presume that the Jew and the Muslim are mistaken and that it is he who is correct in his 
beliefs [while] the others are vainly mistaken?24 
 
If the intensity of devotion and the strength of one’s beliefs were the sole criteria of 
certainty, reasoned Crousaz, how could one argue that Christianity could claim its status as the 
true  religion?  Reason  alone,  not  faith,  he  concluded,  could  prove  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
Revelation and its superiority to other revealed religions. Without such rational proofs, it was 
neither more nor less certain than other faiths.  
Crousaz drew an analogy between Huet’s lack of commitment to a philosophical sect and 
the implications of his view for religion. Huet had argued that he did not wish to adhere to any 
strict philosophical system because he neither wished to be mistaken in matters nor desired to 
dispute about matters in which he could reach no certainty.25 Crousaz suggested that, by Huet’s  
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logic, the diversity of religions should have led the learned author of the Traité philosophique de la 
foiblesse de l'esprit humain to conclude: “I should there not embrace any religion, from fear of erring 
in my choice, and I will regard them all as equally doubtful.”26  
  Crousaz and other anti-skeptics believed that Pyrrhonism presented a danger not only to 
religion but also to morality and to the maintenance of a stable society. He argued that while 
reason provided rational proofs for the existence of God and for the truth of the Christian 
Revelation, it also guided individuals toward morally virtuous behavior. However, if one assumed 
that reason could not prove anything with certainty, then on what basis could one judge particular 
acts as immoral?27 Consequently, any measure of virtue and vice would vanish, while the passions 
and the drive to fulfill sensory gratification would become the guiding force of all human action. 
  Crousaz found particular faults with the way in which Bayle’s Dictionnaire had retold 
numerous stories of debauchery and impropriety in the most vivid details. He dismissed Bayle’s 
excuse that such examples were merely historical facts and that, as a historian, Bayle was justified 
in offering these stories to his readers.28 Instead, Crousaz believed, the famous Pyrrhonist had 
done this in order to entertain his readers and to attract a wider public by offering scandalous 
tales.29 Far from using these stories in order to make his audience deplore human depravity, 
Crousaz claimed, “Bayle had walked the imagination of his readers through dangerous ideas.”30 
Thus, he warned that the Dictionnaire furnished new examples of deviance for the libertins érudits. 
Crousaz asked the readers rhetorically: 
 
To what end do uncertainty and the impossibility of freeing oneself from it drive [us], if 
not to lead us to conclude that men have no advantage with respect to brutes, that the 
pleasures of the mind are nothing but chimaeras, and that the voice of nature calls upon 
us to abstain from these tiring daydreams in order to calmly imitate the sensuality of wild 
beasts?31 
 
Indeed, he argued, this devious intention was precisely what made Bayle so popular 
among the most heterodox minds. “In his own time,” he wrote, “Mr. Bayle had eluded the 
accusations of Pyrrhonism and of atheism, which now make up a great part of his merit in the 
eyes of his supporters.”32 While allowing for the possibility, however improbable, that Bayle’s 
intentions  were  not  malicious,  Crousaz  nevertheless  pointed  to  the  danger  of  the  logical 
consequences that followed from Bayle’s examples of moral depravity and his arguments against 
rational proofs of religion.33 Intentionally or not, the Dictionnaire became a deadly weapon in the 
hands of subversive intellectuals. 
Pyrrhonism was not only dangerous to religion and to morality, Crousaz claimed, but to 
the progress of knowledge in general. By questioning the most indubitable principles and by 
establishing  a  logical  equivalence  between  the  most  certain  and  the  most  questionable 
propositions, philosophical skeptics were explicitly and implicitly suggesting that the search for 
metaphysical, physical, moral, and religions truths was inevitably doomed to failure. “If reason,” 
wrote Crousaz, “is condemned to never be able to assure itself of the truth, it is a waste of time to 
seek it, and would it not be more worthwhile to amuse oneself by wasting it on the most trivial 
subjects  than  on  the  most  important  ones?”34  Such  an  outcome,  for  him,  was  the  greatest 
intellectual consequence of the rising popularity of philosophical skepticism. Bayle’s critic also 
repeatedly invoked the contrast between light and darkness, a characteristic juxtaposition in the 
rhetoric of the Enlightenment. Although he sternly defended religion against the Pyrrhonists, 
Crousaz perceived a similarity between the goals of religious fanaticism and of philosophical 
skepticism, suggesting that both sought to cast mankind into the obscurity of ignorance. 
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Potential Cures 
The opponents of skepticism agreed that the remedies to the Pyrrhonist disease were not 
easy  to  find.  The  anonymous  correspondent  of  the  Bibliothèque  Germanique  wrote  that  real 
Pyrrhonists  were  so  deranged  that  finding  a  cure  for  them  was  improbable.  He  questioned 
whether  the  skeptics’  “derangement  was  voluntary,  whether  they  took  some  pleasure  in  it, 
whether they stubbornly clung to their opinions, and whether they fed their vanity.”35 He noted 
that it would be impossible to “bring them [the skeptics] back from their confusion” since they 
purposely  try  to  not  understand  the  words  of  reason  that  are  offered  to  them.36  Echoing 
Crousaz’s distaste for the undue preference for rhetoric, the author suggested that one potential 
cure was in teaching the skeptics to think before they spoke so that they gradually gain respect for 
the love of truth and for évidence. 
However, the author remained unconvinced about the possibility of such an outcome, 
since the skeptics enjoyed contradicting others, purposely fled the truth instead of seeking it, and 
obstinately refused to accept any arguments that did not confirm their belief in the weakness of 
human reason. Instead of arguing with the skeptics, he admitted that he merely mused at their 
ramblings: 
 
I limit myself to listening to them and to instructing myself, by listening to them, in the 
different deviations to which the human mind is subject and in the confusions to which 
the passions carry it. I benefit from remarking the sad and shameful effects of idleness, 
rashness, pride, and sensuality.37 
 
The  helpless  state  of  the  skeptics’  minds  evoked  the  sense  that  it  was  an  incurable 
disease,  which  absolved  the  author  from  having  to  answer  the  numerous  difficulties  and 
paradoxes posed by Bayle and other skeptics. 
Crousaz similarly noted that, strictly speaking, committed skeptics could not be cured 
from  their  love  of  contradiction  any  more  than  a  drunkard  or  a  religious  fanatic  could  be 
reasoned with. Crousaz held the skeptics’ position to be illogical, because he believed that they 
did not reason in good faith: their love for contradiction and dispute caused them to adopt 
positions  that  were  at  odds  even  with  their  own  views.38  While  Crousaz  admitted  that  no 
argument, however self-evident or reasonable, was likely to force a committed Pyrrhonist to 
retract  his  position,  he  nevertheless  advocated  engaging  the  skeptics  in  debate  instead  of 
punishing  them.  Such  debates,  he  suggested,  could  at  least  unsettle  deranged  minds  in  their 
commitment to universal doubt. The chief goal of such discussion, however, was to reason with 
those who had not yet fully committed themselves to the intractable position of the skeptics:  
 
All that one should expect is to take advantage of whatever respect there is for reason 
among those who are weakened by the sophisms of the Pyrrhonists, and to make them 
taste the clarity that guides to certainty.39  
 
Thus, Crousaz aimed to show the philosophical and practical weaknesses of skepticism 
to  those  readers,  whom  he  believed  to  be  in  danger  of  becoming  skeptics.  By  inoculating 
potential victims, he hoped to prevent the further spread of the Pyrrhonist pestilence. Such a 
preventative measure was, for Crousaz, far more important and productive than curing already 
“diseased” skeptics. 
  The first line of attack, pursued by the author of the Examen, involved demonstrating the 
theoretical inconsistency of the skeptics, whom he believed to be “in perpetual contradiction with 
themselves.”40 The greatest logical fault of Pyrrhonism, in Crousaz’s view, was that it was not  
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self-reflexive either in its methods or in its conclusions. In seeking to undermine the powers of 
human reason, the skeptics, nevertheless, relied on the established rules of logic and on the 
accepted definitions of terms. For example, argued Crousaz, Sextus Empiricus had maintained 
that man was composed of mind and body. By what means, he asked, could a skeptic, who 
claimed that no proposition could be known with certainty, understand the meaning of his own 
words?41 How could a skeptic speculate about matters such as truth or certainty, without defining 
the meaning of these concepts? And would the very act of defining terms such as mind, reason, 
and truth, as Huet did in his skeptical treatise, not constitute an acceptance of some fundamental 
assumptions, thereby refuting skepticism?42 
Furthermore, Crousaz argued that the skeptics themselves sought to prove the dogmatic 
claim  that  true  and  certain  knowledge  of  the  world  was  unattainable.43  It  was  in  vain,  he 
maintained,  that  the  Pyrrhonists  tried  to  argue  that  our  inability  of  knowing  anything  with 
certainty was itself uncertain: “This proposition ‘ALL IS UNCERTAIN’ is [either] true or false; if 
it is false, then you are wrong in maintaining it and the opposite is true; if it is true, then there is 
some truth.”44 Thus, Crousaz noted, the skeptics found themselves in an unwinnable position. If 
they  were  correct  in  their  assertion  (despite  the  inconsistency  of  having  made  a  dogmatic 
statement) that no true and certain knowledge could ever be obtained, then they had articulated 
the only certain proposition and, consequently, disproved that assertion. In proving the validity of 
their  ultimate  conclusion,  the  skeptics  inevitably  undermined  it  and  demonstrated  that  some 
certain knowledge, however limited, was possible.  
In fact, Crousaz disputed, the ultimate conclusion of skeptical philosophy was based on a 
logical leap. Having observed particular deficiencies of the human mind the skeptics jumped to 
general observations about its capacities. Using specific examples of mistakes or ambiguities in 
reasoning, the Pyrrhonists extrapolated a universal conclusion regarding the mind’s weakness. For 
Crousaz, the skeptics argued along the following lines: “Many people were mistaken; therefore 
one cannot be assured of anything.”45 This led the Pyrrhonists to mistakenly conclude: “We 
cannot  know  anything,  since  we  cannot  know  everything.”46  Such  deductions  appeared  to 
Crousaz to be both excessively drastic and logically invalid. 
  While skeptics such as Huet denied the possibilities of reaching any certainty in rational 
investigations, they argued that all knowledge was merely probable.47 Crousaz, however, objected 
to this, claiming that the skeptics could no more reach conclusions about the probable nature of 
things than they could obtain true and certain knowledge of the world. He reasoned thus: 
 
A  Pyrrhonist  who  reasons  in  this  way  may  easily  recognize  that  he  is  contradicting 
himself, if this disease allows his mind to reflect freely and sincerely. The most probable 
is that which most resembles that which is true; and how is it possible for me to judge if 
an opinion has more or less the semblance of being true, unless I know the nature of 
truth?48 
 
In other words, a skeptic who made judgments about probabilities had to abandon his 
perpetual doubt and to accept implicitly that human reason had the capacity for acquiring some 
knowledge. It was only out of extreme insincerity, Crousaz noted, that a skeptic could deny the 
high probability or the moral certainty of universally accepted propositions.  
  At the same time, Crousaz agreed that one could make use of the skeptical method in 
many  investigations.  Indeed,  he  even  supported  a  moderate  version  of  mitigated  and  partial 
skepticism with regard to questions that seemed difficult or impossible to solve. He argued that 
such moderate doubt would of benefit in preventing any foundational skeptical conviction: 
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A prudent suspension [of judgment], far from aiding Pyrrhonism, is a great means to 
prevent it. It is from having been too credulous and, through this, having been filled with 
a thousand errors and uncertainties, that the impatient minds choose the side of believing 
that [all] examination is useless, instead of making an effort to retrace their steps and to 
study prudently…But from the fact that such a suspension is appropriate in some cases, 
it does not follow that it should be universal.49 
 
By suggesting that certain aspects of philosophical skepticism could be used in critical 
scholarship,  Crousaz  attempted  to  admit  the  usefulness  of  the  methods  while  refusing  the 
ultimate conclusions associated with them. By contrasting sensible skepticism with the radical 
Pyrrhonism he hoped to portray his opponents as unreasonable fanatics. 
 
Conclusion 
The  turn  toward  the  reliance  on  moral  certainty  and  probability  was  one  common 
solution for thinkers who opposed extreme skepticism. One the one hand, such a turn served as 
an  admission  that  the  Pyrrhonist  claim  about  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  complete 
metaphysical certainty was correct. Unable to disprove the skeptics completely, their opponents 
had to cede ground and admit that complete epistemological certainty was unattainable. On the 
other hand, the anti-skeptics did push back against the claim that nothing could be known with 
completely certainty, by suggesting that such certainty was not necessary for philosophical or 
practical enquiries. 
  The attempts to portray extreme skepticism as a disease, a derangement of the mind, and 
a corruption of the heart provided several advantages to the anti-skeptics. First, by using an ad 
hominem argument and portraying the skeptics as unreasonable, insincere, and deranged, their 
opponents attempted to appeal to the reading public and present skeptical claims as arguments 
that were impossible to answer because they were inconsistent and purposely misleading. By 
discrediting the sources of Pyrrhonist attacks, the anti-skeptics could relieve themselves of the 
need to disprove the various arguments of their adversaries. Second, by equating Pyrrhonism with 
a dangerous disease that was spreading through society like an epidemic, opponents of skepticism 
could focus on the hypothetical consequences of adopting skepticism as a philosophical position, 
rather than focusing on the arguments of the skeptics. The enumeration of the negative social 
effects, as seen most evidently in von Haller’s text, moved attention away from philosophical 
matters, and raised the stakes of the debate. According to the anti-skeptics, the issue was not just 
philosophical truth, but the very survival of society. Third, the conflation of Pyrrhonism with 
irreligion, atheism, libertinism, and materialism allowed the apologists to present skepticism as the 
underlying  intellectual  cause  of  these  various  symptoms.  Such  an  association  made  the  case 
against skepticism all the more credible to the reading public. 
  It would not be unfair to say that Crousaz, Haller, and other anti-skeptics were, in some 
ways, preaching to the choir: their descriptions of the moral depravity and of the intellectual 
malady of the skeptics reinforced the notions that the opponents of Pyrrhonism had already 
associated with it.50 At the same time, in order to be effective, the opponents of skepticism 
needed to address a broader audience to make skepticism seem unappealing. They mostly agreed 
about that fact that fully convinced skeptics could never be cured from their “disease,” but they 
sought to prevent the apparent growth the in ranks of the Pyrrhonists.  
  Despite  the  anti-skeptics’  best  efforts  or,  at  least  in  part,  because  of  them,  Bayle’s 
Dictionnaire historique et critique continued to enjoy enormous popularity in the intellectual world of 
the eighteenth century. Ironically, in seeking to refute his opponent, Crousaz cited large sections 
of Bayle’s work, exposing it to an even wider audience. In 1734, just a year after the publication  
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of Crousaz’s Examen, a fifth edition of the enormous four-tome folio Dictionnaire was printed in 
Amsterdam.51 Bayle’s views on religious toleration and his critiques of established opinions made 
him a wildly popular figure in the second half of the eighteenth century.52 Indeed, during the 
course of the century his opus magnum became one of the most widely owned seventeenth-century 
texts in French private libraries.53 
  However, the efforts of the anti-skeptics were not entirely in vain. While the philosophes 
appreciated the critical spirit of philosophical skepticism, particularly its attacks on religious and 
philosophical dogmatism, few Enlightenment thinkers truly embraced the ultimate conclusions of 
Pyrrhonism. In the Entretien entre D'Alembert et Diderot, Denis Diderot declared to the imaginary 
D’Alembert:  
 
In that case, there is no such thing as a skeptic, since, apart from mathematical questions 
which admit of no uncertainty, there is for and against in all questions. The scales, then, 
are never even, and it is impossible that they should not hang more heavily on the side 
we believe to have the greatest probability.54 
 
This attitude, articulated by one of the most radical Enlightenment thinkers, encapsulates 
the spirit of the various refutations of Pyrrhonism. Although the critical attitude of Bayle and 
other skeptics remained an important weapon in the arsenal of the philosophe, few Enlightenment 
thinkers would argue that the human mind was incapable of knowing anything with certainty. The 
methods  of  philosophical  skepticism  provided  the  philosophes  with  ability  to  overcome  their 
opponents,  but  these  arguments  could  seldom  be  used  to  construct  new  epistemological  or 
ontological systems. Indeed, the rational pragmatism of Crousaz and other anti-skeptics would 
prove to be far more in line with the growing confidence in the powers of human reason. 
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